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I
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3). This appeal is
taken following Sydney Arthur Wengreen's ("Mr. Wengreen" or "Appellant") conviction
after a jury trial.
Mr. Wengreen initially filed his notice to appeal on October 21, 2004. Clerk's
Record (hereinafter "CR") 782. Due to procedural defects, the Court, sua sponte,
dismissed the action. Thereafter, Mr. Wengreen filed a Manning Petition to restart his
time for appeal. CR795. On October 24, 2005, Mr. Wengreen's right to appeal was
reinstated by stipulation to grant the Manning petition. CR808. This appeal is timely
since Mr. Wengreen resubmitted a Notice of Appeal on November 4, 2005. CR 811.
II
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wengreen's Motion for Arrest of
Judgment or New Trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct.

2.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wengreen's Motion to Compel
compliance with a Subpoena Duces Tecum, which sought medical records and
treatment of the victim.

3.

Whether the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wengreen's Motion for New Trial
based on newly discovered evidence.

///
///

Ill
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
Mr. Wengreen appeals from his conviction of aggravated sexual abuse of a child,
in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-404.1(3).
On October 4, 2002, the jury convicted Mr. Wengreen on the above-mentioned
violations. CR 192. The Honorable Judge Wilmore of the First Judicial District, in and
for Cache County, presided over the proceedings. Id.
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
On March 20, 2002, the Cache County Attorney's Office filed a criminal
information against Appellant, charging Appellant with three counts of aggravated sexual
abuse of a child, in violation of Utah Code Annotated §76-5-404.1(3). CR 1.
On October 2, 2002, a three day jury trial commenced. CR 140-192. On October
4, 2002, the jury convicted Mr. Wengreen on Count 1 but found Mr. Wengreen not guilty
on the remaining counts. CR 192.
On October 11, 2002, Mr. Wengreen filed a motion for arrest of judgment or for
new trial based upon prosecutorial misconduct. CR 185-203. On January 17, 2003, the
trial court denied the motion for a new trial and set a sentencing hearing. CR 328-331. A
true and correct copy of the January 17, 2003, memorandum decision is attached hereto
as Exhibit A.1

1

Along with this opening brief, Mr. Wengreen has lodged with the Court three
other documents: a general Exhibit Book, which contains Exhibits A-C; the PSR in this

Based on post-trial statements and diagnosis, Mr. Wengreen subpoenaed Logan
Regional Hospital and the Utah State Hospital for records regarding K.S.'s mental health
treatment. Mr. Wengreen sought such records to support his Motion for New Trial on the
basis of newly discovered evidence. Counsel for both hospitals subsequently contacted
Mr. Wengreen's counsel and communicated their refusal to comply with the subpoenas.
Thereafter, on February 20, 2003, Mr. Wengreen's counsel filed a motion to compel, and
the State moved to quash. CR 345.
On March 6, 2003, after hearing oral argument, Judge Wilmore granted the State's
motion to quash, reasoning that Mr. Wengreen had not met the standards set forth by
State v. Blake, 2002 UT 113. CR 454-456.
Thereafter, Mr. Wengreen petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for permission to
file an interlocutory appeal. That petition was subsequently denied. CR 476-528.
On March 27, 2003, Mr. Wengreen was sentenced. CR 551-553.
On April 7, 2003, Mr. Wengreen filed a second motion for new trial based on
newly discovered evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. CR 558.
On October 1, 2003, the trial court heard oral argument and took the matter under
submission, pending issues that needed to be resolved. CR 742. Thereafter, on October
8, 2004, in a memorandum decision, the trial court denied Mr. Wengreen's motion for

relevant to Mr. Wengreen's motion for new trial, Exhibits H-L, which has been
transmitted under seal. As the Court knows, Appellant was directed by this Court, in an
April 20, 2006, order to resubmit his briefs and place under seal the PSR and new trial
documents. Furthermore, undersigned counsel is contacting the trial court now in order
to request that the PSR in this case be transmitted to the Court pursuant to Utah R. App.
12(b)(1). The PSR, and its relevant Exhibits, are denoted here as Exhibits D-G.

new trial (Exhibit B). The final order denying Mr. Wengreen5s Motion for a New Trial
was entered on November 8, 2004. A true and correct copy of the Court's order is
attached as Exhibit C.
C. DISPOSITION OF THE CASE
On March 27, 2003, Mr. Wengreen was sentenced to an indeterminate term of not
less than five years in the Utah State Prison. CR 551. Mr. Wengreen was also ordered to
take sex abuse therapy while at the prison, and fined $18,500 plus interest. Upon
completion of therapy classes, the entire fine was to be suspended. Mr. Wengreen was
further ordered to pay all counseling costs of the victim. Id. Mr. Wengreen is currently
incarcerated at the Utah State Prison.
IV
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A, Jury Trial
At trial, the complaining witness, "K.S.", testified that at the time of the alleged
incident she was thirteen years old. Trial Transcript, Volume I (hereinafter "TT") at 161.
K.S. testified that she moved to Hyrum, Utah, on July 31, 2000, and met Mr. Wengreen
and his family around September of that year. TT 162. K.S. testified that she was asked
to baby-sit for Mr. Wengreen and his family, and that she worked on Mr. Wengreen's
family farm every Saturday and Sunday to work off a horse that K.S. was purchasing
from Mr. Wengreen. TT 163-165. K.S. testified that she stopped working on the farm
around May or June of 2001. TT 169.
K.S. testified that the first incident with Mr. Wengreen happened after she baby-

sat on a Friday night. K.S. testified that Mr. and Mrs. Wengreen went out on Friday night
"date nights." K.S. testified that Mr. and Ms. Wengreen came home after their date, and
the three of them watched a movie. Thereafter, K.S testified that Ms. Wengreen went to
bed and Mr. Wengreen started to rub her legs and kiss her neck. TT 176-178. K.S.
further testified that Mr. Wengreen picked K.S. up and unzipped her pants and laid on top
of her. K.S. stated that Mr. Wengreen started to touch her buttocks and told her how
pretty she was. TT 179.
K.S. testified that the second incident occurred when the two of them went to a
cattle auction in Smithfield around spring of that year. TT 181. K.S. testified that Mr.
Wengreen laid K.S. down in a truck, rolled up her shirt and rubbed her stomach. TT 183184.
K.S. also testified that sometime before June of 2002, Mr. Wengreen called K.S.
and asked her to come baby-sit so he could go to the airport. TT 186. K.S. testified that
when she got to the Wengreen home, Mr. Wengreen was playing with his children.
Thereafter, Mr. Wengreen told the children to go downstairs and pick out a game to play.
TT 187. K.S. testified that Mr. Wengreen picked her up and took her to his room and laid
her on his bed. Id. She stated that he laid down and placed her on top of him, and that he
unzipped her pants and rolled them to the zipper and touched her buttocks. TT 188.
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked K.S. about certain journal entries
K.S. wrote in her diary. K.S. confirmed that she snuck over to the Wengreen's home
even when she wasn't required to baby-sit; and that she had also indicated in her diary
that she was going to be very lonely when the Wengreen family left because she was very

close to them. TT 218. K.S. also read to the jury her journal entries for the days
immediately following the alleged first incident (which allegedly occurred the prior
Friday). K.S. had written that she "went baby-sitting and that was a blast today... And
Friday [she] went to school and went baby-sitting. That was another blast." TT 221.
In opening statement, the prosecutor stated K.S. and Mr. Wengreen's wife were
good friends. TT 139. K.S. also testified that she and Ms. Wengreen were very close.
Trial Transcript, Volume II at 52. Further, the prosecutor stated that K.S. worked on the
Wengreen's farm every Saturday and Sunday and that she baby-sat for them quite
frequently. Id.
B.

FIRST MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL BASED UPON PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT
During the trial, the prosecution offered a portion of an audiotape of a telephone

call that K.S. had made to Mr. Wengreen under the direction of police, which was
admitted into evidence as Exhibit 20. TT 211-212. The first portion of the audio tape,
which was a short conversation between K.S. and Mr. Wengreen's wife, was not
admitted into evidence. Id.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, the following facts were not disputed
by the parties:
1. The Court clearly ruled at least two times that the conversation between the
victim and Defendant's wife was inadmissible.
2. The Court instructed State's counsel to redact the inadmissible portion.
3. The prosecution understood clearly it was not to go to the jury.

4. The complete tape containing the inadmissible portion went to the jury.
5. The jurors did not listen to the inadmissible portion of the tape. CR 329.
Thereafter, the Court found that defendant had failed to present any evidence
Or facts supporting the notion the jury had listened to the inadmissible portion or that
they were influenced by the inadmissible portion being in the jury room. The Court then
denied Mr. Wengreen's motion for new trial. CR at 330; see memorandum decision
dated January 17, 2003.
C NEW EVIDENCE
After the trial concluded, Mr. Wengreen received Mr. Wengreen's presentence
investigative report (hereinafter "PSR"). Based on the information contained in the
presentence report, Mr. Wengreen presented the following new evidence to the Court in
support of both his motion to compel subpoenas, and, later, in his motion for new trial
based on new evidence and prosecutorial misconduct.
1. The victim was interviewed on Monday (the trial had ended on Friday). PSR 18,
Para. 1.
2. The investigator's report is contained on pages 18-24 of the PSR. The following
portions of the PSR contain new evidence which supports a motion to compel
subpoenas and a motion for a new trial:
a. Statements and conduct that was for the first time reported by the victim
during the interview. PSR 18-19.
b. During the preparation of the presentence report, the investigator talked to
the victim's mother, who had acquired information from the victim and

reported it to the investigator. PSR 22 Para 6.
c. A letter on September 24, 2002, regarding the emotional and mental health
of K.S. (which predated the trial). PSR 23.
d. A letter received by the drafter of the presentence report, dated February 4,
2003.
e. A letter received by the drafter of the presentence report, dated January 24,
2003.
f. A letter received by the drafter of the presentence report from the victim's
mother dated January 28, 2003.
P. MOTION TO COMPEL SUBPOENA
At the hearing on Mr. Wengreen's motion to compel, defense counsel argued that
much of the information that was provided to the presentence investigator was
inconsistent with K.S.'s trial testimony, which was less than two days old at the time of
the PSR interview. Specifically, at the time of trial, K.S. testified that the most grievous
conduct was that Mr. Wengreen touched her on the buttocks. However, the Monday
following trial is when she told the investigator about additional, more severe conduct.
PSR 18-19.
Defense counsel argued that this information demonstrated that there was evidence
of mental illness which may reasonably cast doubt on the ability of K.S. to tell the truth at
trial. Specifically, defense counsel argued that the victim may suffer dissociative
amnesia, which is an inability to recall important personal information, usually of a
traumatic or stressful nature. A copy of the DSM-IV which was presented to the trial

court is attached hereto as Exhibit H. Defense counsel argued that this mental illness
prevented K.S. from testifying truthfully at trial. March 6, 2003, Motion Transcript, pg.
16-17, 20. The defense further alleged that K.S. could be transferring her memories of
other abuse onto Mr. Wengreen. Id. at 15-16, 21.
The trial court found that "this case falls squarely under Blake and falls squarely
under Rule 506 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. at 43. A true and correct copy of
State of Utah v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56(Utah 2002) is attached hereto as Exhibit I. A true and
correct copy of Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 506 is attached hereto as Exhibit J.
However, the trial court found that the requested records and information were privileged
under Rule 506. March 6, 2003, Motion Transcript, pg. 44. Further, the trial court
specifically found that "Mr. Wengreen [had] not met the burden that the Supreme Court
[had] placed upon [the judge] to make a decision with regards to the disclosure of these
confidential records." Id. at 47. Therefore, the trial court granted the hospitals' motion
to quash the subpoena duces tecum and denied defense counsel's motion to compel. Id.
A true and correct copy of the transcript, pp. 43-47, is attached hereto as Exhibit K.
E. NEW TRIAL BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE AND PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT MOTION HEARING
On April 7, 2003, Mr. Wengreen filed his second motion for a new trial based on
new evidence and prosecutorial misconduct. CR 560, 600-668. The new evidence was
such that the prosecution was privy to but the defense had no knowledge of. Id. The
prosecution admitted having knowledge that the victim had been abused on other
occasions. CR 578-595. This information was not disclosed to Mr. Wengreen at the time

of trial.
Further, at trial, the victim testified that the most grievous conduct by Appellant
was that he touched her buttocks. However, in the presentencing report, the victim for
the first time disclosed additional information of a more severe nature. PSR 18-19.
a. Dr. Vickie Gregory
Based upon this new evidence, defense counsel offered the affidavit of Dr. Vickie
Gregory in support of Mr. Wengreen's second motion for new trial. In reviewing the
available information, including the PSR and letters from various mental health care
providers, Dr. Gregory looked at the issue of whether K.S.'s psychological conditions
would affect her ability to provide reliable testimony at trial. Dr. Gregory discovered
numerous references in the PSR and the letters that indicated K.S.'s psychological
condition at the time of trial likely affected her trial testimony.
Dr. Gregory indicated that the K.S.'s trial testimony could have been affected by
her post-trial emotional and mental health in that:
a.

K.S.'s memories and ability to provide accurate testimony could
have been altered;

b.

that symptomatic "amnesia" associated with the disorders can
creates a lack or loss of memory, which may have led K.S. to
engage in "compensatory techniques" including, among other
things, "the substitution of reports from others for real
memories;"

c.

that symptomatic recurrentflashbacksand nightmare could alter

K.S.'s memories and reduce her ability to provide reliable
testimony;
d.

if others have abused K.S., mental issues could result in confusion
or transference of the memories of abusefromother perpetrators
onto Mr. Wengreen;

e.

finally, if therapy was conducted with K.S. prior to her testimony,
therapeutic techniques could alter memories of abuse.

Dr. Gregory concluded that based on her review of the records, the incident
involving Mr. Wengreen, as reported by K.S. at trial, would not produce the severe
psychological disorders as diagnosed. As such, Dr. Gregory was of the opinion that some
other psychological trauma was responsible for K.S.' s mental health rather than the
reported trauma associated to Mr. Wengreen.
b. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Further, the defense counsel argued that during the presentence investigation, the
probation officer received a letter, which predated the trial. A copy of this letter was
disclosed to defense counsel at the beginning of trial. The prosecutor intended to call a
specific witness during the trial, but had not provided defense counsel with anything
other than the referenced letter. The defendant raised the fact that he had not been given
notice of the witness, since the witness had not been listed in the State's witness list. As
such, the trial court did not allow the witness to testify. The contents of the letter are
contained in the presentence report. PSI23.
Further, as discussed above, at the post trial hearing on the motion to compel

compliance with the subpoenas, the State, in response to a direct question by the Court,
stated for the first time that K.S. had been abused by someone else. Additionally, as also
discussed above, in response to a subpoena issued by defense counsel to the Cache
County Sheriffs Office, the State further acknowledged that K.S. had been sexually
abused by two other individuals in April 2002, and that such information was within the
knowledge of the department.
V
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
During trial, the prosecution was ordered twice to redact portions of an audio tape
which contained inadmissible hearsay evidence of K.S. speaking with Mrs. Wengreen.
However, the prosecution did not redact the tape, as they were instructed by the Court to
do; rather, the full audiotape went to the jury. This unduly prejudiced Mr. Wengreen's
chances of a fair trial because it was tantamount to commenting on Mrs. Wengreen's
silence, since Mrs. Wengreen did not testify at the trial. The court did not take into
consideration the fact that the jury had to pause during deliberation while waiting for the
tape to fast forward through the inadmissible portion, which undoubtedly caused the jury
to question why Mrs. Wengreen did not testify at trial.
Further, literally on the heels of the trial, K.S. suffered a complete emotional
breakdown, calling into question the true mental state she was in during the trial. In a
case like Mr. Wengreen's, where the credibility of the witness was essential, and where
such evidence irrefutably called into question the ability of the complaining witness to
testify truthfully and reliably, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wengreen's motion for

new trial. Further, the trial court erred in denying Mr. Wengreen's motion to compel
compliance of subpoenas for K.S.'s medical records when Mr. Wengreen demonstrated
through extrinsic evidence, and with reasonable certainty, that the sought-after records
contained "exculpatory evidence that would be favorable to [his] defense." State of Utah
v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56(2002).
Further, Mr. Wengreen was entitled to any and all police reports regarding
possible abuse by others, as well as any information known by prosecutors regarding the
fragility of K.S.'s mental health. Since the trial, the prosecution had admitted that at least
three other individuals had abused K.S. This information was all the more important
when combined with K.S.'s severe mental health issues because the trauma inflicted by
others was projected onto Mr. Wengreen. Such information was material, should have
been disclosed, and the trial court's failure to grant a new trial was erroneous.
VI
ARGUMENT
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for Arrest of
Judgment or New Trial Based upon Prosecutorial Misconduct.

1. Standard of Review
When reviewing a district court's denial of a motion for a new trial for
prosecutorial misconduct, an appellate court will not reverse absent a clear abuse of
discretion by the district court. This standard is met only if the error is substantial and
prejudicial such that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence, there would have
been a more favorable result for a defendant. For purposes of determining whether a

mistrial should have been granted, the appellate court's overriding concern is that the
defendant received a fair trial. State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262 (Utah 1998); State v. Hay,
859 P.2d 1, 7 (Utah 1993); State v. Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 287 (Utah 1989).
2.

Prosecutorial Misconduct Influenced the Jury and was Prejudicial
Error

A prosecutor's comments constitute misconduct when they call the jurors1 attention
to matters not proper for their consideration and when the comments have a reasonable
likelihood of prejudicing the jury by significantly influencing its verdict. State v.
Pearson, 943 P.2d 1347, 1352 (Utah 1997).
In the present case, Mrs. Wengreen, Appellant's wife, did not testify at trial.
However, a tape was made of her conversation with K.S., which the prosecutor was
ordered by the Court to redact. Further, the trial court found that the prosecution
understood it was not to go to the jury; yet, the complete tape containing the inadmissible
portion went to the jury.
Despite the prosecutor's disregard of the court order, the trial court found that the
jurors did not listen to the inadmissible portion of the tape, and concluded that it did not
influence the jury. CR 329. However, the jury knew that Mrs. Wengreen's statements
were there, and as such, this undoubtedly caused the jury to pause and question why Mrs.
Wengreen never testified at trial. The trial court failed to consider that the mere fact that
the jury had to sit and wait as they fast forwarded through Mrs. Wengreen's statements
was tantamount to a comment on her silence at trial. This prejudice was further
compounded by the fact that the prosecutor stated in his opening statement that K.S. was

very close to the entire Wengreen family, that K.S. was at the Wengreen home often, and
that K.S. testified that the first incident happened after Ms. Wengreen went to bed, in a
room that was adjoining the room where the alleged incident took place. TT 176-78, 22627. As such, the failure to redact the relevant portions was prosecutorial misconduct
which unduly prejudiced Mr. Wengreen's ability to receive a fair trial.
B.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Motion to Compel
1.

The Standard of Review

As to a request for a Utah R. Evid. 412 hearing, the Supreme Court of Utah
reviews the question of law for correctness while deferring to the lower court's subsidiary
factual determinations. A court's decision regarding the existence of a privilege is a
question of law for the court, and is reviewed for correctness. State of Utah v. Blake, 63
P.3d 56 (Utah 2002).
2

The Trial Court Erred When it Found that Mr. Wengreen Had Not
Met the Blake Standard

Utah R. Evid. 412(c) states that a party must file a motion stating with specificity
the evidence sought to be admitted and the purpose for its admission. Utah R. Evid. 506
provides a privilege for confidential communications between a patient and her therapist
in matters regarding treatment. Utah R. Evid. 506(b). The rule provides that no privilege
exists if an otherwise covered communication is relevant to an issue of the physical,
mental, or emotional condition of the patient in any proceeding in which that condition is
an element of any claim or defense. One must show, with reasonable certainty, that the
sought-after records actually contained "exculpatory evidence that would be favorable to

his or her defense." State of Utah v. Blake, 63 P.3d 56(2002). In the present case, Mr.
Wengreen presented extrinsic evidence in support of his motion to compel subpoenas for
medical records of K.S. The extrinsic evidence offered by Mr. Wengreen demonstrated
to a reasonable degree of certainty that the subpoenaed documents would have been
favorable to Mr. Wengreen's defense. First, the evidence demonstrated that K.S. had
exhibited symptoms consistent with that of an individual who is mentally ill. PSI18, 23.
Further, the prosecution confirmed that another person was being investigated for abusing
K.S. The evidence also demonstrated that K.S. changed her story dramaticallyfromthat
of her trial testimony only days after the trial had concluded. PSR 18-24. As such, the
extrinsic evidence demonstrated that at the very least, K.S. was suffering from a mental
illness which affected her trial testimony. This was exculpatory in that it went to K.S/s
credibility in a case where the bottom line was the witnesses' credibility.
Additionally, some occurrences that K.S. reported, post-trial, simply did not occur.
See PSR 22 Para 7; see letter dated January 28, 2003. Further, the trial Court made a
finding at sentencing that defense counsel had not badgered K.S. and had acted in an
entirely respectful and professional manner. This indicates that K.S. may have been
suffering from mental or emotional deficiencies during trial which materially affected her
trial testimony, and which unduly prejudiced Mr. Wengreen at trial.
C.

The Trial Court Erred in Denying Appellant's Motion for New Trial Based
on Newly Discovered Evidence
1. Standard of Review
An appellate court reviews the denial of a motion for a new trial based on newly

discovered evidence on the same basis as any other denial of a new trial motion —
whether the trial court abused its discretion. State v. Loose, 994 P.2d 1237 (Utah 2004).
An appellate court views the facts in a light most favorable to the jury verdict and recites
them accordingly. Id.
2. New Evidence
After the trial, the following "new evidence" came to light and was presented to
the trial court in Mr. Wengreen9s Motion for New Trial:
a.)

K.S. 's version of events completely changed within days of her trial
testimony. PSR 18-24

b.)

K.S.'s actions pursuant to PSR 18 Para. 4.

c.)

K.S.'s actions pursuant to PSR 18 Para. 2.

d.)

K.S.'s diagnosis pursuant to PSR 23.

e.)

A family member had been investigated for abusing K.S.;

f.)

Two other individuals sexually assaulted K.S. in April of 2002.

This new evidence suggests that K.S.'s testimony was not reliable, possibly
incompetent, and it certainly establishes that K.S.'s ability to accurately report was
compromised. Such inaccurate and untrustworthy testimony prejudiced Mr. Wengreen,
especially in a case of this nature, where there was no physical evidence, no
eyewitnesses, and where the entire case revolved around the credibility of the child
witness. Such evidence was crucial; indeed, the jury convicted Mr. Wengreen on only
one of the three charged offenses.
Utah case law has long established that a new trial may be appropriately based

upon the discovery of new evidence that was not available at the time of trial. See e.g.
State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220 (Utah 1985), State v. Edmunds, 73 P. 886 (Utah 1903);
State v. Halford, 54 P. 819 (1898). Evidence must meet three criteria in order to
constitute grounds for a new trial: (1) it must be such as could not with reasonable
diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial; (2) it must not be merely
cumulative; and (3) it must be such as to render a different result probable on the retrial
of the case. All three of these criteria must be met. State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793
(Utah 1991). See also State v. Martin, 2002 UT 34, 44 P.3d 805 (Martin II), Martin I,
1999 UT 72 at P5, P17. Cf. Mathews v. Galetka, 958 P.2d 949 (Utah App. 1998) (citing
similar standard in post-conviction context).
In Martin I, the Supreme Court had previously reversed the denial of a motion for
new trial, imanimously holding that the defendant was entitled to discover the
information he sought which carried "strong" impeachment value and could significantly
impact "the central issue of the case - [who] to believe about the circumstances of the
sexual contact." Martin I, 1999 UT 72, at P 16. On appeal, after remand, the Supreme
Court held that the "newly discovered evidence possesses a reasonable likelihood of both
discrediting [the victim's] testimony and making [the defendant's] version of the events
more credible." Martin II, 2002 UT 34, at P 49. The Court reversed the conviction on
the three-factor test outlined above and held:
"Accordingly, in recognition of the crucial role of credibility to this case- and in
view of the far-reaching impact the newly discovered evidence could have on a jury's
detennination of that issue - we hold that the trial court erroneously concluded the

evidence was too 'insignificant' to constitute grounds for a new trial. The newly
discovered evidence is not only material and relevant to the "central issue" of the case,
but, if accepted as such by the jury, may constitute the difference between conviction and
acquittal." Id. at P 49.
Due to the fact that the new evidence regarding K.S.'s mental state and ability to
truthfully and accurately report went to the sole issue presented to the jury, i.e. who to
believe in an absence of any other evidence, the trial court abused its discretion in
denying Mr. Wengreen's motion for a new trial based on new evidence.
a. A New Trial Should Have Been Granted Because "New Evidence" Has Been
Adduced Since Trial Which Could Make a Different Result Probable Upon Retrial.
K.S.'s "new evidence" warranted a new trial, as K.S.'s new version of events was not
just "evolving testimony" that sometimes occurs after trials, where additional details are
remembered or added that were forgotten. In the present case, K.S.'s statements after
trial demonstrated a markedly different version of events than her trial testimony.
In applying the new evidence analysis set forth above, K.S.'s changed version of
events clearly could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at
trial. Throughout the pretrial and trial stages, K.S. was fairly consistent in her account of
events. Although there were some minor inconsistencies between the DCFS interview
and the preliminary hearing, these inconsistencies were not unusual in a case such as this.
Despite questioning by the prosecution and defense counsel, K.S.'s version of events at
trial remained mostly consistent with her prior statements. However, a mere two to three
days after trial, K.S.'s account was so markedly different that it casted doubt upon the

reliability and truthfulness of her trial testimony, and further begged the question as to
why her version of events was so drastically different. Further, the changed allegations
were not merely cumulative of a defense theory. The new version of events, for whatever
reason they were given, demonstrated that K.S.'s trial testimony was inaccurate.
Whether the changed allegations would have made a different result probable on
retrial is the key issue here. K.S.'s differing rendition was made at a vulnerable time;
instances of mental illness and reported abuse could.have impaired her sense of "reality".
See PSR 18 Para. 2, 4; PRS 22 Para. 5; PRS 23. This goes to the very core of her
competence and ability to accurately report, not only in the days after the verdict, but also
during trial. As such, it is not what K.S. had reported that is the essential issue here, but
the fact that her reports were entirely different and, in some cases, did not comport with
known reality and uncontested facts.
b. The New Evidence Makes a Different Result Probable
Additionally, K.S.'s severe mental and emotional state was revealed after trial.
PSR 18-24. After the verdict, the emotional and mental health of K.S. was diagnosed.
PSR 23. Certain conduct that was known prior to the verdict, as it pertains to the mental
and emotional health of the victim, should have been revealed to the defense during trial.
PRS 23. The failure of the prosecution to reveal pertinent information until after the trial
renders this "new evidence." Such conditions and revelations clearly could not have been
discovered and produced at trial by the defense (unless revealed by the prosecution), nor
were the revelations merely cumulative of evidence adduced at trial.
Importantly, evidence of emotional and mental health concerns made a different

result probable on retrial Such conditions went to the very heart of the case concerning
who to believe about allegations of abuse. If such conditions were longstanding and
severe, then they would cast doubt on K.S.'s ability to provide reliable and trustworthy
testimony, which leaves the possibility that K.S. confused or projected instances of
misconduct onto Mr. Wengreen that were committed by another person. Moreover,
certain conduct by K.S. during the trial exemplified that she was not in a correct state of
mind to even testify, and if known at the time, would have been found to be incompetent.
c. Post-Trial Revelations of K.S.'s Mental and Emotional State Warranted a
New Trial
In looking at the new evidence in this case, the new evidence would have provided
the jury with a very reasonable explanation of K.S. 's trial testimony and pointed toward
Mr. Wengreen's innocence. In short, K.S.'s mental and emotional health both before and
during trial not only made K.S.'s trial testimony unreliable, but explained why and how
she could have been mistaken in her allegations against Mr. Wengreen. The jury never
heard about the prior sexual abuse perpetrated upon K.S. by three offenders. Nor did
they hear a reasonable explanation as to why, throughout her journal entries, K.S. spoke
in glowing terms of Mr. Wengreen, all the while accusing him of sexually abusing her.
The new evidence shows that K.S. blamed Mr. Wengreen for instances that may have
occurred with other offenders. Indeed, this newly discovered evidence would make a
different result likely, not only because of the impeachment of the witness but because
the jury would be able to have a reasonable explanation of her testimony.
///
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3. Similarly, the State's Nondisclosure of Mental Health Issues and Evidence of
Prior Abuse of K.S. Required a New Trial
a. Law Regarding Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Evidence,
"It is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in
its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment."
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987). A prosecutor's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence violates a defendant's right under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. See e.g. Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995); United States v. Augurs, All
U.S. 97 (1976). These legal principles apply equally in the consideration of the state due
process clause under Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State Constitution. See, e.g. Walker
v. State, 624 P.2d 687 (Utah 1981). "In a criminal trial it is essential that evidence which
tends to exonerate the defendant be aired as fully as that which tends to implicate him."
State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 818, 225 (Utah 1980). This obligation to disclose applies
equally to impeachment evidence and to evidence that was not requested by the defense.
See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1990); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667,
676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972).
Moreover, the "state's obligation to disclose is not limited to information in the
custody of the prosecutor." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437. "The law imposes a duty upon the
individual prosecutor to learn of any favorable evidence known to others acting on the
government's behalf in the case, including the police." Id. This is so because the
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"prosecution, which alone can know what is undisclosed, must be assigned the
consequent responsibility to gauge the likely net effect of all such evidence and make
such disclosure when the point of 'reasonable probability' is reached." Kyles, 514 U.S. at
437. As such, there is no leeway to hold back evidence because of uncertainty about
whether the evidence would prove exculpatory at trial. "[T]he government simply cannot
avoid responsibility for knowing when the suppression of evidence has come to portend
such an effect on a trial's outcome as to destroy confidence in its result." Id. at 439. This
is consistent with the Court's long held view that "a prudent prosecutor will resolve
doubtful questions in favor of disclosure." Agurs, All U.S. at 108. See also, State v.
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, P38 ("[i]t is not for a prosecutor to substitute his or her judgment
for that of a defendant with respect to whether exculpatory evidence is sufficiently
material to warrant disclosure. . . Where a judgment call must be made. . . doubts should
be resolved in favor of disclosure.").
b. Applicable Standard for New Trial Based on Non-Disclosure
Failure of the prosecution to disclose evidence warrants a new trial where there is
prejudice to the defendant. See Strickler, 527 U.S. at 281-82. Prejudice occurs when the
State's failure to disclose affects a Defendant's fundamental rights - such as a right to a
fair trial. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678 (1985). A defendant's right to a
fair trial is undermined when "there is reasonable probability that, had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id. at
682. A "showing of materiality" however, "does not require demonstration by a
preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately

in the defendant's acquittal.5' Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). The question
is "not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial,
understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence." Id. (emphasis
added.)
Finally, the withheld evidence must be examined "collectively, not item by item."
Id. at 436. See also State v. Martin, 1999 UT 72, ^ 9; State v. Jarrell, 608 P.2d 218, 225
(Utah 1980) (undisclosed police reports considered in light of totality of evidence). Thus,
in close cases, the withholding of evidence will have a greater impact on the outcome
than in those cases where there is a greater amount of evidence supporting the verdict.
See Agurs, All U.S. at 113, n.21; Jarrell, 608 P.2d at 224.
c. Evidence Withheld by the Prosecution Requires a New Trial
It is clear that the State had in its possession information that at least three other
individuals had abused K.S. Such information was admittedly never disclosed to Mr.
Wengreen. Further, if the State knew about a number of situations pertaining to the
emotional and mental health of K.S. during the trial, it had a duty to disclose that
information to Mr. Wengreen as such would be clearly probative of K.S. ability to
reliably and accurately testify at trial.
An intended witness of the State could have revealed the emotional and mental
health of the victim to the State. PSR 23. The State, in conversations with this witness,
could have become aware of information pertaining to the emotional and mental health of
the victim. If so, the State had a duty to disclose that information. The fact that the
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prosecution was intending on calling this witness leads to the logical inference that
discussions were held between the State and this witness concerning K.S.'s emotional
and mental conditions, and possible treatment and diagnosis. If the prosecutor knew of
the specifics of K.S.'s mental health issues, as stated in PSR 23, that would constitute
exculpatory evidence regarding K.S.'s trustworthiness, and Mr. Wengreen was entitled to
that information as part of normal discovery under Brady. Such evidence was not only
exculpatory, but was also relevant to punishment.
Such information would have clearly affected trial counsel's preparation for trial
and presentation of the case to the jury. Moreover, such evidence was constitutionally
material in that K.S.'s emotional state would have substantially affected her ability to
"perceive, recall, and relate accurately the events of the [molestation]." Bakalov, 1999
UTatP39.
VII
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Sydney Arthur Wengreen respectfully requests that this
Court reverse his conviction. Alternatively, Mr. Wengreen respectfully requests that this
case be remanded for a new trial.
Dated: August 2, 2006

CRIMINAL DEFENSE ASSOCIATES

BY:rf*4t*4<AXl
Mark McBride
Attorneys for Appellant
Sydney Arthur Wengreen

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 3th day of August, 2006,1 hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief was sent to the following parties, via the United
States Postal Service:
Utah Attorney General's Office (2 copies)
Appeals Division
P.O. Box 142320
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-2320
James Swink, Esq. (1 copy)
Deputy Cache County Attorney
11 West 100 North, 2nd Floor
Logan, UT 84321

Mark McBride

